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Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault
Reform:
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Ending Intra-Military Sexual Assault
MITSIE SMITHt
INTRODUCTION
Men and women join the United States Armed Forces
not only as an opportunity to serve their country, protect
national security, and fulfill the mission of its military, but
also with the expectation that they will be treated with
dignity-that their rights and freedoms will be preserved,
and that they will be afforded the safeguards of a justice
system that works to protect those rights under the law.
One of the most profound lessons learned in the
military is the value of ensuring the well being of a fellow
service member. A service member will develop and is
expected to maintain a spirit of cohesion and solidarity with
their fellow service members as well as their units.
Otherwise, the goal of working together to form a respected
and powerful fighting force will be compromised. This
involves risking one's life for another, coupled with the
obligation of keeping the other from harm. This bond is not
unique to the military, but is the prototypical example of
such communal assurance, which is central to the military's
mission and purpose. When this cohesive bond is breached,
it is as if a security operation has been compromised, or a
unit has failed in carrying out its mission. Likewise, the
burden of sexual assault' is not only borne by individual
victims, but its consequences to the military and its mission
are heavy.
t J.D., The State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2011.
1. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE [hereinafter "UCMJ"] Art. 120
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2011)) (defining the crimes that constitute sexual
assault rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct for purposes of
military justice).
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This comment explores whether the current reforms in
military justice, specifically the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, are enough to reduce cases of intra-military sexual
assault. The focus will be on prosecutorial discretion, how
command influence2 affects the prosecutorial process, and
how these factors may or may not influence the overall goal
of reducing sexual assault crimes against female service
members.
Sexual assault and harassment scandals are not new to
the military. Since the integration of women in the Armed
Forces,' there have been numerous reports of sexual
assaults against women. Women account for over thirteen
percent of active U.S. military force in each branch,
excluding the Marine Corps.' Since the scandals of the
early 1990s, most notably, the infamous Tailhook scandal in
1991, there have been renewed pledges to combat sexual
2. See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL 11-4 (2008) [hereinafter "MCM"],
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awd awcgate/law/mcm.pdf (governing the
actions of Convening authorities for Courts-martial). Rule 104 provides that
convening authorities cannot "censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any
member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or
sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of its or
his functions in the conduct of the proceedings." Id.
3. See Elizabeth L. Hillman, Front and Center: Sexual Violence in U.S.
Military Law, 37 PoL. & SOC'Y 101, 104 (2009) ("Since the Vietnam War, law
enforcement personnel, health care professionals, and scholars from many
academic disciplines have studied the problem of sexual violence in and around
the U.S. armed forces."); Michael I. Spak & Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military
Culture on Responding to Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 79, 81-82 (2004) (discussing the persistence of sexual harassment in the
military despite military efforts to eradicate it).
4. For a brief history of the integration of women into the Canadian and
United States military forces, see WIVES AND WARRIORS: WOMEN AND THE
MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 55-61 (Laurie Weinstein & Christie
C. White eds., 1997). Prior to the integration of women in the regular armed
services in the 1970's, women served in wars as temporary or auxiliaries
separate from the nursing services in World War I and II, until Congress
created several military units specifically for women during World War II, such
as the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and the Navy Women's Reserve
(WAVES). See id. at 58.
5. Statistics on Women in the Military, WOMEN IN MILITARY SERVICE FOR
AMERICA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, INC. (February 18, 2011),
http://www.womensmemorial.org/PDFs/StatsonWIM.pdf.
6. See generally WILLIAM H. McMICHAEL, THE MOTHER OF ALL HooKS: THE
STORY OF THE U.S. NAVY'S TAILHOOK SCANDAL (1997). United States Navy and
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assault within the military. Most recently, a series of
congressional hearings were held to address the sexua*l
assault crisis after the widely reported Air Force Academy
scandal in 2003.'
The Department of Defense (DoD) pledged to
aggressively respond to sexual assault incidents within the
military.! Shortly thereafter, the Department produced an
investigative report on the extent of sexual assault
problems at the Air Force Academy.' The Defense Task
Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services was
established to address the crisis, and the Task Force
implemented measures which resulted in a marked
improvement in reporting by victims: a 24% increase in
reporting from 2005 to 2006.10 The DoD pledged in their
2008 report to continue the development of the Defense
Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), among other
programs, to aid in analyzing reports to enhance
accountability."
Marine Corps aviation officers sexually assaulted 87 females at a Las Vegas
hotel in 1991 at the Tailhook Association's Annual Symposium. Id. Following
subsequent investigations, a number of officers were disciplined and several
others were accused of knowingly allowing the incident to occur. Id.
7. Editorial, The Air Force Academy Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2003, at
A16, available at http://www.nytimes. com/2003/03/08/opinion/the-air-force-
academy-scandal.html?pagewanted=1.
8. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, DEP'T OF DEF.
DIR 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAM PROCEDURES
3-4, (June 23, 2006) [hereinafter "DoD DIR. 6495.02"], available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/649502p.pdf (describing DoD policy
on sexual assault prevention and response); Amy Herdy & Miles Moffeit,
Military Assaults Spur Call to Action, THE DENVER POST, Jan. 30, 2004,
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_0001924219
9. REPORT OF THE PANEL TO REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS AT THE
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY (2003), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2003/d20030922usafareport.pdf.
10. DEP'T. OF DEFENSE, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, REPORT
ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 2 (2006), available at
http://www.sapr.mil/media/pdf/reports/2006-annual-report.pdf.
11. REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 21-22 (2008) [hereinafter
"2008 REPORT"], available at
http://www.sapr.mil/medialpdf/reports/dodfy08_annual-report-combined.pdf.
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As Department reports have confirmed, sexual assault
is perhaps one of the most traumatic of violent crimes. 2 It
not only goes against the good order and discipline of the
armed services, it also poses a significant threat to military
readiness." According to the DoD, "sexual assault" does not
describe one particular crime, but refers to a broad range of
sex crimes-from rape and indecent assault to "attempts to
commit these offenses."l4 The military services combined
completed over 1000 investigations as of Sept. 30, 2008,
resulting in 407 commander actions ranging from
administrative disciplinary measures to Courts-martial
actions. "
Since this is not the first time there have been reforms
in military law, nor is there a shortage of "zero tolerance"
pledges from current and past administrations as well as
military commanders, it is fitting to examine the reasons
why a change in command culture and a check on
prosecutorial discretion in the military justice system is
important in addressing the crisis of sexual assault within
the military. I will address (1) the purpose of and
underlying policy behind punishing intra-military sexual
assault; (2) prosecutorial discretion within the military
justice system; and (3) the comparisons between the
characteristics of sexual abuse in the military and civilian
context, investigatory and prosecutorial roles and the social
context of the prosecution of sexual assault.
I. PUNISHING INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT
Because prosecution of sexual assault offenses is one of
the central factors behind the underlying policy in
addressing the crisis, the utility of prosecution in the justice
system as a deterrent to criminal action must be explored.
12. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 67 (2004), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/may2004/d2OO4O513satfreport.pdf.
13. 2008 REPORT, supra note 11, at 7; NAT'L ADVISORY COUNCIL ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, TOOLKIT TO END
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN PREVENTING AND
RESPONDING TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, Ch. 15, at 1 (2001), available at
http://www.saiv.net/SourceBook/Storage/documents/Toolkit/fullchapterl5.pdf.
14. 2008 REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
15. Id. at Appendix C.
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The two prevailing theories more apt to this analysis are
the theories of retribution and deterrence. The deterrence
theory holds that individuals are deterred from engaging in
criminal activity because they fear the consequences of the
act.'6  Retribution is the theory that society punishes
individuals for past acts, and that the punishment is
justified because it is deserved." The main priority in
reform measures should be placed on the social aspects of
punishment in the military.
Deterrence is the dominant purpose favored and one of
the main goals of all efforts to control the sexual assault
crisis and to prevent future criminal conduct rather than
exacting retribution. The goal is to hold those responsible
accountable for their acts in order to prevent future
undesirable behavior. The focus here will be on general
deterrence, wherein individuals are deterred from
committing crimes if they see that guilty offenders are being
punished and have regarded that punishment as negative
reinforcement by society, and thus, an adverse consequence
of offending.19
Johannes Andenaes cautioned against the pitfalls of the
optimistic effects of generalized deterrence.20 He noted that
in addition to the general deterrent approach, the
peculiarity of the offense should be analyzed to determine
the offender's motivation-norms and circumstances of the
offense.2' All these factors are taken into account in
determining whether or not the threat of punishment will
affect certain persons.22 If potential sexual assault
16. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 13-15 (1991); see also OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 29-31 (ABA 2009) (1881).
17. See HOLMES, supra note 16, at 29; see also Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 29
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
18. See BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
IDEAS, PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES IN MODERN PENAL THEORY 80 (1996);
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 10 (1990).
19. For a discussion of general deterrence, see W. BUIKHUISEN, GENERAL
DETERRENCE: RESEARCH AND THEORY (1975).
20. Johannes Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 345-46 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
21. Id.
22. Id.
1512011
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perpetrators were to use these factors in a military context,
their aversion to the negative consequences might deter
them from committing sexual assaults."
Some utilitarian philosophers believe that unless the
punishment prevents greater harm than the punishment
inflicted on the offender, then the punishment only adds to
the totality of the harm." To avoid the problems inherent in
overzealous prosecution, and preserve the integrity of the
military justice system, the rights of the accused must be
taken into account.25
Both theories have their proponents and critics. No one
pure application of either theory will produce the desired
results unless the provisions to preserve the rights of those
accused are observed. 26  Any overly ambitious promise to
crack down on sexual assault offenses without lasting
enforcement may only have a fleeting effect, like other cases
have been following highly publicized scandals. 27 Therefore,
I suggest an overall reevaluation of the system of military
culture and response to sexual misconduct through actual
enforcement of the reforms that are already in place.
23. See WALKER, supra note 16, at 15 (discussing the mechanisms of general
deterrence).
24. See HUDSON, supra note 18, at 18-19.
25. See Brian C. Hayes, Strengthening Article 32 to Prevent Politically
Motivated Prosecution: Moving Military Justice Back to the Cutting Edge, 19
REGENT U. L. REV. 173, 178-79 (2007) (discussing the detrimental effects on
military readiness and unit cohesion caused by baseless accusations against
military offenders); see also BARBARA HUDSON, JUsTICE THROUGH PUNISHMENT: A
CRITIQUE OF THE 'JUSTICE' MODEL OF CORRECTIONS 62-63 (1987) (discussing
arguments by various theorists that general deterrence "should not be pursued
at the expense of the individual offender").
26. See Hayes, supra note 25, at 178-79.
27. See Juanita M. Firestone & Richard J. Harris, Perceptions of Effectiveness
of Responses to Sexual Harassment in the US Military, 1988 and 1995, 10
GENDER, WORK & ORG. 42, 57 (2003); cf CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 236 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the ebb and flow of U.S.
response to civilian sex crimes over the last century).
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A. Reform of Military Justice and Policy on Sexual Assault
The UCMJ2 8 is the foundation of military law and
applies to all service members of the United States Armed
Forces.29 "The essence of the military justice system is swift
punishment to ensure discipline.""o Violations of the UCMJ
are disposed of "unofficially"31 by administrative discipline32
through non-judicial punishment for Article 15 offenses," or
by courts-martial depending on the severity of the offense.34
Congress made sweeping amendments to Article 120 of
the UCMJ in 2006, which became effective October 1, 2007
pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act.3 The
punitive Article 120 formerly called "Rape and Carnal
Knowledge" was renamed, "Rape, sexual assault, and other
sexual misconduct."36 The amendments removed failure to
give consent as an element of the offense of rape.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (authorizing Congress to make rules for
the regulation of the armed forces).
29. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2011) (defining what persons are subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice).
30. Lieutenant W.G. "Scotch" Perdue, Weighing the Scales of Discipline: A
Perspective on the Naval Commanding Officer's Prosecutorial Discretion, 46
NAVAL L. REV. 69, 83 (1999).
31. Id.
32. See MCM, supra note 2, at p. V-2, § 1(g) (discussing "administrative
corrective measures"). Administrative disciplinary measures range from
withholding of privileges and reprimand to corrective training, which is an
efficient way of dealing with minor misconduct. Id. The goal is to maintain good
order and discipline. Id.
33. See UCMJ, Art. 15 (2011) (listing various forms of non-judicial
punishment for minor offenses that do not warrant a court martial). Non-
judicial punishment takes on a more formal approach with more serious
consequences for an offender than administrative discipline. Id.
34. See 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (also UCMJ Art. 15) (noting that non-judicial
punishment is reserved for minor offenses for which intervention of a court-
martial is not necessary).
35. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163 §552, 119 Stat. 3136 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (West, Westlaw through
112th Legis. Sess.)).
36. Id.
37. See 10 U.S.C. § 920(t)(14) ("An expression of lack of consent through
words or conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical
2011 153
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Additionally, the amendments replaced some offenses under
the general punitive statute, Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM) Article 134 offenses." The MCM "provides
regulations which explain, amplify and implement the
UCMJ."39 Other punishable offenses not codified under the
specific punitive articles of the UCMJ deemed "prejudicial
to the good order and discipline," or which will "discredit"
the services are brought under Article 134.40 The new
reform measures removed those relating to sexual assault to
Article 120.'
In addition to the amendments of Article 120, the DoD
established task forces specifically to respond to the
increased incidences of sexual assault in the armed services
involving service members. The Defense Task Force on
Sexual Assault in the Military Services (Task Force)42 was
created to examine matters relating to sexual assault by
and against members, and to submit reports on those
activities to the Secretary of the DoD and to the Secretaries
of the Army, Air Force and Navy so that they may respond
to the sexual assaults.43 The Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Office (SAPRO) was also established within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and is accountable for the
DoD's policy on sexual assault."
resistance or submission resulting from the accused's use of force, threat of
force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent.").
38. See MCM, supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that some of the articles replaced
are indecent assault, indecent exposure, and indecent acts with another).
39. Scott A. Liljegren, Winning the War Against Sexual Harassment Battle By
Battle: Why the Military Justice Model Works-A Proposal for Federal and State
Statutory Reform, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 189 (1999) (quoting BRENT G. FILBERT
& ALAN G. KAUFMAN, NAVAL LAw: JUSTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE SEA SERVICES
19 (3d ed. 1998)).
40. See MCM, supra note 2, at IV-111 to 112 (discussing application of Art.
143).
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. The Task Force was authorized under the provisions of Federal Advisory
Committee Act of 1972; National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.108-375
§576 (2005).
43. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 576, 118 Stat. 1811.
44. See DoD DIR. 6495.02, supra note 8 (describing SAPRO's responsibilities
in section 5.3).
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B. Policy on Reporting
SAPRO was made responsible for improving the system
for reporting incidences of sexual assault.45 As recent
studies have indicated, most incidents of sexual assault that
occur in the United States are not reported to law
enforcement.46 The same is also true in the military. The
number of under-reported cases for sexual assault in the
military is very high.47 In 2005, the DoD's sexual assault
policy provided for a confidential reporting option.48 Two
systems of reporting were put in place: restricted and
unrestricted reporting.49 The restricted reporting system
was implemented to encourage reports without triggering
the investigative process."o Restricted reporting allows the
victim to seek medical and counseling resources" and
provides for unrestricted reporting in the future according
to certain guidelines if the victim consents.52 However, this
45. Id.
46. See Michael R. Rand, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal
Victimization, 2007, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULLETIN 1, 7 (2008), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf (finding that only 41.6% of the
sexual assaults in the U.S. were reported to law enforcement in 2007); Rape in
America: A Report to the Nation, NAT'L VICTIM CENTER & CRIME VICTIMS
RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CTR., 5 (1992), available at
http://www.musc.edu/ncvc/resourcesprof/rape-in-america.pdf (citing research
showing that only 16.1% of rapes are reported to police); Callie Marie Rennison,
Rape and Sexual Assault: Reporting to Police and Medical Attention, 1992-2000,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULLETIN 1 (2002), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/contentpub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf (reporting that only 36% of
rapes and 26% of sexual assaults were reported to police during 1992 to 2000);
Katherine M. Skinner et al., The Prevalence of Military Sexual Assault Among
Female Veterans' Administration Outpatients, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
291, 306 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of ascertaining rates of sexual assault).
47. Memorandum from the Deputy Sec'y of Def. to Secretaries of the Military
Dep'ts (Mar. 16 2005), available at
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/ConfidentialityPolicyVictimsSexualAssault.pdf
(stating that sexual assault is the most under-reported violent crime in our
society at large and in the military).
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 2.
52. See DEP'T OF DEF. INSTR. 6495.01, SExUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE (SAPR) PROGRAM 12-16 (Oct. 6, 2005) [hereinafter "DOD INSTR.
1552011
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reporting system, as ground breaking as it is, falls short in
some important aspects, and has been the subject of
criticisms and recommendations by observers of the reform
policies." Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC)54
make the restricted reports to a senior commander but
current policy does not clarify whether the reports (with
"non-identifying information") are to be made to the senior
commander of the victim or the commander of the alleged
offender."
Current studies comparing the reported cases of civilian
sexual assault by victims and military victims found that
civilian victims are more likely to report incidents of sexual
misconduct and that military victims are more likely to
have "poorer functioning" after a sexual assault, reasoning
that perhaps this is because civilians are usually not likely
to encounter the perpetrator in other aspects of their
professional life." Similarly, the effects and trauma of
sexual assault were found to contribute to poorer
functioning after such incidents among military victims."
These conclusions were attributed to the fact that for
victims of sexual assault in the military, the perpetrator is
often a "coworker, supervisor, or personnel with higher
rank," and the victim "may be required to continue working
with her perpetrator, which is less likely to occur in many
6495.01"], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdfl
649501p.pdf.
53. See Michael I. Spak & Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military Culture on
Responding to Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L. REV. 79,
82-83 (2005) (criticizing new methods used to remedy sexual harassment in the
military). See generally Lieutenant Commander Ann M. Vallandingham,
Department of Defense's Sexual Assault Policy: Recommendations for a More
Comprehensive and Uniform Policy, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 205 (2007).
54. See DoD DIR. 6495.02, supra note 8, at 4. Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators are individuals designated by each branch of service to oversee
and maintain the Service's sexual assault prevention program, keep track of
and analyze reports of sexual assault. Id. at 15-18.
55. Id. at 16; Vallandingham, supra note 53, at 218.
56. See Alina Suris et al., Mental Health, Quality of Life, and Health
Functioning in Women Veterans: Differential Outcomes Associated with Military
and Civilian Sexual Assault, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 179, 193 (2007).
57. Id.
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civilian ,-situations."" Consequently, the unrestricted
reports of sexual assault will be the focus of this article
because those reports are followed up with command action,
investigations, and possible prosecution of the offense. In
addition to allowing the victim to receive medical care and
counseling, unrestricted reports provide for an official
investigation of the allegations, and the details can be
reported to law enforcement, the command, Veterans
Affairs, or a SARC.59
The 2008 DoD Report on Sexual Assault in the Military
found that service members were the victims of over 1,594
or 70% of unrestricted reports of sexual assault."o The
services reported that of the 425 command actions taken on
completed investigations into unrestricted reports
completed by end of fiscal year 2008, most were disposed of
by administrative action and discharges." Overall, the DoD
statistics are not indicative of whether prosecuting sex
crimes leads to a corresponding decline in intra-military
sexual assault; rather, the statistics provide more
information on the reporting trends that climb each year.6
The statistics indicate the incidents where reporting led to
actual investigation which resulted in prosecution. It is
still too soon to tell the degree of difference thorough
investigation and prosecution of sexual assault will have
upon command policy and the UCMJ reforms. However, the
upward trend should demonstrate the immediacy of the
crisis and demonstrate that more resources and attention
will be allocated to combat the problem.
Because there is no complete study at this time on the
effect of prosecution on decreasing sexual assault in the
military, a look at civilian data may aid in discovering a
pattern. Although the civilian context is not identical to the
unique challenges of a confined military community and
58. Id. at 193; see also Hillman, supra note 3, at 109 ("The typical incident
involves a junior female enlistee assaulted on a military base by a more senior
serviceman.").
59. 2008 REPORT, supra note 11, at 10; DOD INSTR. 6495.01, supra note 52, at
9, 11.
60. 2008 REPORT, supra note 11, at 34.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 33.
63. See id. at 35-36.
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culture, trends on the civilian side may show the likelihood
of success in the military. Similar trends in civilian criminal
reports have shown a substantial decline from 1999 to 2008,
while violent crimes that have been reported declined by a
smaller margin from 1999 to 2008.64
This is not a call for mass prosecution of the accused
without regard to a guaranteed protection of a service
member's rights. A knee-jerk reaction to the public's
heightened awareness of the military's sexual assault crisis
would not solve the problem as evidenced by the widely
publicized scandals in recent memory." In assessing this
delicate situation, the focus is on lasting solutions to the
increasing incidents of sexual assaults through the prism of
the prosecutorial process.
Critics of the role of the prosecutorial process in
reducing violent crimes within the military have argued
that when a problem such as this is within the public
spotlight, despite the lack of evidence, commanders and the
convening authorities alike will be overzealous and quick to
prosecute in order to show that the military is tough on
sexual assault.66 While this ambivalence and skepticism of
recent reform measures may be warranted, credence must
be lent to certain safeguard features of military law and the
constitutional rights afforded the accused especially in the
military justice system. Commentators on military justice
have maintained that military law offers more protection of
the rights of the accused than most civilian systems.
Gilligan and Wims contend that "[t]he truth is that the
rights guaranteed to service members in the pretrial, trial
and post-trial stages are far more protective than the rights
64. See Michael R. Rand, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal
Victimization, 2008, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULLETIN 1, 2 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (citing statistics that show the
rates of rape and sexual assault have declined 52.6% between 1999 and 2008,
while violent crimes in general have declined by 41.2% in the same time period).
65. See McMICHAEL, supra note 6. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE TAILHOOK REPORT (1993).
66. See Hayes, supra note 25, at 174 ("The political pressures inherent in the
military justice system create a dangerous incentive for court-martial convening
authorities to prosecute despite lack of evidence.").
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granted individual citizens in both the federal civilian and
the state courts."67
An accused has the right to defense counsel for special
and general courts-martial in all military courts except the
summary court-martial. 8 In the preliminary stages of
investigation or in an Article 32 hearing, the accused are
granted rights unparalleled in the civilian grand jury
process applicable in some jurisdictions. 69 A civilian grand
jury process does not afford a testifying accused the right to
confrontation, and the opportunity to present evidence.70 In
jurisdictions where there is a grand jury system, the
prosecutor controls the presentation of evidence and the
accused does not have the right to cross-examine witnesses
who might testify against him; the accused only has this
right when preliminary hearings are conducted.
There are also greater protections in rights against self-
incrimination under the UCMJ than Miranda." For the
service member who is accused, the comprehensive
discovery rules under the UCMJ afford greater benefits,
ensuring the accused is able to present a rigorous and
thorough defense with all relevant information. In some
civilian jurisdictions however, the discovery rules do not
require the prosecutor to provide a list of witnesses it
intends to call or list of all known witnesses, nor statements
made by prospective government witnesses in connection
67. Francis A. Gilligan & Michael D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military
Justice, 5 CRIM. JUST. 2, 3 (1990); see also MILITARY R. EVID. 301-321 (providing
the rules of evidence with respect to "self-incrimination and certain other
statements").
68. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 48 (holding there is no right to
counsel in a summary courts-martial). The purpose of this judicial level is to
expediently dispense of relatively minor infractions. Id. at 32. Only enlisted
service members are subject to the summary court jurisdiction, where a
commissioned officer presides. Id. An accused does not have to submit to
summary court-martial, but has the right to choose instead to be tried by the
two higher levels where there is a right to appointed counsel. Id. at 32-33.
69. See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 50-51 (1992) (discussing various grand jury
procedures in civilian courts).
70. See FED. R. CRIM. P. §6(d).
71. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 69, at 51-52.
72. See Gilligan & Wims, supra note 67, at 5.
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with investigation data." Furthermore, service members
may seek review of unjust decisions made by their
commanders through an Article 138 complaint.74 So while
certain hierarchal structures of the military justice system
may not always be amenable to reform measures, or where
implementation of these measures are not so easily
accomplished, there is still significant value in the reform's
purpose and mission notwithstanding these flaws.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITHIN THE MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Military commanders have uniquely different
responsibilities with potentially widespread consequences
not contemplated by their civilian counterparts." Not only
are they decision makers with regards to disposing of UCMJ
violations, they have a level of responsibility unmatched by
civilians in comparable managerial positions, because they
are not only accountable for the workers in the workplace,
but also accountable for their actions outside of work. In
other words, the commander has numerous and diverse
duties, which range from military-centered command
responsibilities to being decision makers in prosecuting
cases.
There is a dual objective of military justice. This
bifurcated approach contemplates strengthening the
national security of the United States by maintaining good
order and discipline in the ranks." This analysis focuses on
incidents that a commander may believe are serious enough
to warrant court-martial action. A typical court-martial
case begins when there is a report of an incident, whereby
the commander will conduct his own initial investigation, in
some cases informally or through the military investigation
73. See Major General Jack L. Rives & Major Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian
Versus Military Justice in the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L.
REV. 213, 222-23 (2002) (comparing discovery under the Virginia rules and the
rules for general court-martial).
74. UCMJ Art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006).
75. Diane H. Mazur, Military Values in Law, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
977, 1007 (2007).
76. MCM, supra note 2, at pt. I, Preamble.
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agencyn in order to determine if there is evidence to support
a finding of probable cause, to dismiss the charge without
further action, or to proceed with non-judicial action."
After this initial investigation, the commander prefers79
charges (in the case of a serious Article 120 offense) and
forwards those charges to the convening authority with the
power to direct the level of court-martial warranted for the
trial.o If an offense is serious enough to warrant a general
court-martial, the charges must be referred to an Article 32
Investigation.' An Article 32 Investigation or pretrial
hearing is convened by a special court-martial convening
authority.82 After a report from the Article 32 Investigating
77. Each branch of the military has their own investigative agency. The
agency for the Army is the Central Investigation Division (CID). Army
Regulation 10-87 Ch. 4 (2007) and Army Regulation 195-2 (2009) outline the
specific functions and responsibilities of the CID as investigators of all serious
crimes within the Army. Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) operates
under authority of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). See Navy Instructions
5430.107 (2005). The Air Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI) operates
under the direction of the Air Force Inspector General to conduct criminal
investigation involving Air Force personnel in accordance with P. L. No. 99-145,
99 Stat. 583 (1985), and counter-intelligence under Exec. Order 12333.
78. For an overview of the military judicial process, see Michael J. Davidson,
A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAw (1999).
79. "Preferring" is the process of bringing charges under the UCMJ. See
Rules for Court Martial 307 (2008) [hereinafter "RCM"], in MCM, supra note 2,
at Part II.
80. See RCM, supra note 79, at Rule 401(a).
81. An Article 32 investigation is a "thorough and impartial investigation" of
all charges alleged. UCMJ Art. 32(a), 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2006). At an Art. 32
hearing, an accused is granted "full opportunity" to "cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his
own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the accused." UCMJ Art. 32(b), 10
U.S.C. § 832 (2006). This system is similar to that of grand jury hearing.
82. A special court-martial may not sentence an individual to confinement for
more than one year nor assign the most severe discharges-dishonorable
discharge for enlisted or dismissal for officers. See UCMJ Art. 19, 10 U.S.C. §
819 (2006); UCMJ Art. 23, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (2006); RCM, supra note 79, at
504(b)(2). The mid-level or special court-martial is made up of at least three
members; or a military judge and at least three members; or a military judge
alone. UCMJ Art. 16(2), 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2006). Trial by judge alone happens
only if there is a military judge detailed to the court, the accused knows the
identity of the judge, and after consulting with defense counsel, requests orally
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Officer," the commander has the discretion to exercise
several options: (a) dismiss without further action; (b)
forward the charges to a superior or subordinate
commander for disposition; or (c) refer for court-martial.84 If
a general court-martial is warranted, it is then referred to
the general court-martial convening authority ." The
general court-martial convening authority, or GCMCA, is
required to confer with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
before directing the general court-martial.86 . If the SJA
decides all the requirements of Article 34 are met, the
GCMCA can then decide to take no action and notify the
subordinate command, or refer back to the commander to
handle at the other two lower levels of courts-martial or
convene the general court-martial."
A convening authority (CA) convenes courts-martial
pursuant to statutory guidelines." The UCMJ specifies the
level of commanders who can serve as CA to convene the
levels of court-martial to try individuals subject to the
UCMJ.89 Court martial juries are referred to as panel
members." Unlike the civilian jury system, where the jury
on the record or in writing trial by judge alone and the judge approves. UCMJ
Art. 16(2)(a-c), 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (2006).
83. The investigating officer must be a commissioned officer who is not the
accuser, preferably in the grade of major or higher or one with legal training.
See RCM, supra note 79, at 405(d)(1).
84. See RCM, supra note 79, at Rule 404. Before any charge is referred to
court-martial, the commander is required under the RCM to seek the advice of
the judge advocate. See RCM Rule 406.
85. See RCM, supra note 79, at Rule 601. General court-martial is the highest
level, with general jurisdiction over all persons subject to the UCMJ. See
UCMJ Art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006). The court consists of a military judge and
at least five members; or by judge alone with identical provisions and
limitations as to that which is afforded in a special court-martial. UCMJ Art. 16,
10 U.S.C. § 816 (2006).
86. See UCMJ Art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (2006). The requirement of obtaining
the legal advice of the SJA before referral is designed to ensure that the charges
are formally correct and "conform to the substance of the evidence". Id. at §
834(c).
87. Id.
88. UCMJ Art. 22, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2006).
89. UCMJ Art. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (2006).
90. U.S. v. Hilow, 32 M.J. 439, 440 (C.M.A. 1991).
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pool is made up of a broader cross-section of the community,
the convening authority selects members using statutorily-
defined criteria," choosing the best eligible from his own
command.
A. Civilian Justice System
In contrast, the civilian criminal justice system involves
a single body of prosecutors trained in the law and
experienced in criminal prosecution. A District Attorney
has a single role regarding the duties that he or she is
charged to carry out. Decisions on whether or not to
prosecute individuals accused of committing criminal acts
are within a different context. An individual who is accused
of a crime would likely not have reason to interact with the
DA unless that individual is before the justice system. In
contrast, an accused service member has an ongoing
relationship with his commander. A commander is
responsible and accountable for a service member on a daily
basis, on matters relating to their personal life and job
performance, wholly outside of the commander's
prosecutorial role.92 Above all, a commander's responsibility
is to maintain good order and discipline and effectively
promote military justice.93 A civilian prosecutor's duties are
not as broad-his first order of duty is to do justice and
those responsibilities extend to enforcing the law as a
"minister of justice."94
A person accused of committing a criminal offense is
subject to the jurisdiction of the state where the crime took
91. See UCMJ Art. 25(d), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2006); Hilow, 32 M.J. at 441.
92. See Lindsy Nicole Alleman, Who Is In Charge, and Who Should Be? The
Disciplinary Role of the Commander in the Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 170 (2006); Meredith L. Robinson, Volunteers for the Death
Penalty? The Application of Solorio v. United States to Military Capital
Litigation, 6 GEo. MASON L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1998).
93. Alleman, supra note 92, at 191.
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2006); see also Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) (discussing duties of prosecutors to
ensure that "justice shall be done"); PETER A. Joy & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, Do NO
WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS 3 (2009) (discussing whether
or how prosecutor's standards of ethics differ from those governing civil
litigators and criminal defense lawyers).
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place." State systems are decentralized, wherein
prosecutors' offices serve a county-based jurisdiction.96 The
charging function consists of "two decision-making
components: the initial screening determination as to
whether or not to charge (the 'screening function'), and, if
the answer is yes, the subsequent decisions as to choice and
number of charges (the 'selection function').97 The
prosecutor has broad discretion in their decision to
prosecute, in plea-bargaining and overall control of cases
that come before them." Discretion can also be limited by
legislation in the screening phase to certain types of
offenses and through pre-trial diversions.99 For example, a
Minnesota statute requires that local prosecutors file
charges for failure to report physical or sexual child abuse
or neglect, certain criminal sexual conduct, and
environmental law violations.'o In addition to statutory
limits in some jurisdictions, evidence and resources play a
role in the decision process in prosecuting a case."o0
Therefore, the likelihood of charges being filed in a majority
95. Rives & Ehlenbeck, supra note 73, at 215.
96. Steven W. Perry, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN 2, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf In Alaska, Rhode Island, and
Delaware, local prosecutors operate under the control of the state attorney
general. Id. at 11.
97. Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
SuPP. 643, 645 (2002).
98. See CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., PROSECUTORS' CHARGING DECISIONS IN SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 1 (2001) [hereinafter SPOHN ET AL.,
PROSECUTORS' CHARGING DECISIONS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES], available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197048.pdf; Celesta A. Albonetti,
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 291,
292 (1987).
99. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, &NANCY KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §13.6(a)-(b) (3d ed. 2000) (discussing pre-trial diversions).
100. MINN. STAT. § 388.051(2)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
101. See JEANNE C. MARSH, ALISON GEIST & NATHAN CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE
LIMITS OF LAw REFORM 86-87 (1982) (discussing importance or certain
evidentiary factors in sex crimes, and the importance of specialized police sex
crime units to criminal prosecutions).
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of those cases depends on the seriousness of the offense and
the strength of the existing evidence.'0 2
B. Factors Affecting Prosecution-Civilian
There are certain factors that commonly influence the
decision-making process in sexual assault cases. There are
times when prosecutors will use stereotypes about sexual
assault and sexual assault victims in making a decision as
to which cases to take seriously.'3 Therefore, the chances of
a prosecutor filing sexual assault criminal charges when a
victim has a work history in prostitution or exotic dancing
are very low, compared to another victim working in a more
traditional occupation.'" Similarly, decisions to pursue a
sexual assault case when the victim has a history of
engaging in risky behavior, such as drinking heavily,
hitchhiking, or using drugs, are also low.' These factors
lower the chances that a prosecutor will pursue a case,
especially when there are "questions about the victim's
moral character."l06
In weighing the prudence of a decision to move forward
with a case, a prosecutor is not immune from taking into
consideration factors such as the perception of the
community and promoting the notion that they are the
protectors of justice-conviction rates underscore that
102. See Martha A. Myers, Common Law in Action: The Prosecution of Felonies
and Misdemeanors, 52 SOc. INQUIRY 1, 9-10 (1982).
103. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 15-26 (1987).
104. See Jeffrey W. Spears & Cassia C. Spohn, The Genuine Victim and
Prosecutors' Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST.
183, 197 (1996); cf SPOHN ET AL., PROSECUTORS' CHARGING DECISIONS IN SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES, supra note 98, at 46 ("[Plrosecutors' charging decisions in sexual
assault cases involving strangers are not affected by legally irrelevant indicators
of the victim's character or behavior [such as work as a prostitute or exotic
dancer].").
105. See SPOHN ET AL, PROSECUTORS' CHARGING DECISIONS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT
CASES, supra note 98, at 43-46 (finding that prosecutors' charging decisions in
sexual assault cases where the victim and defendant are non-strangers is likely
to be influenced by the victim's risk-taking behaviors, such as drinking, using
drugs, or hitchhiking).
106. Spears & Spohn, supra note 104, at 197-202.
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fact.' 7  Patterns of not guilty verdicts may give the
appearance that a prosecutor is not being tough on crime;"o'
likewise, protecting the rights of an accused who may be
innocent is also important. All of these risks play a role in
the pre-charging stage where a prosecutor analyzes whether
or not certain cases are worth the risk.109 Furthermore,
pursuing a case that should have been thrown out from the
beginning might raise questions about the prosecutor's
competence as a good steward of the court." Calculations
such as what a judge and jury will assume based on the
evidence and victim, the characteristics of the victim such
as gender, ethnicity, race, employment status, relationship
between the victim and the suspect, or the perceived
worthiness of the victim as far as credibility, will ultimately
figure into the final decision and outcome. 1 ' Consequently,
resources are allocated to reflect these risks and
calculations in assessing the strength and merits of certain
cases.11 Some jurisdictions, however, have made sex crimes
a top priority and have eroded some of the unfettered
discretion in screening cases by establishing and allocating
107. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice,
and the "Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1271-72
(1996).
108. See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault:
Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 Soc. PROBS. 213, 215 (1991).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 200-33 (1989) (discussing jurors' responses to rape victims'
behaviors and characteristics). See generally Frohmann, supra note 108
(discussing various factors that affect prosecutors' decisions of whether or not to
file charges in sexual assault cases).
112. See Wallace D. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Rape Reform
Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 582 (1980)
(discussing advantages of specialized bureaus in prosecution of sexual assault
cases). See generally BATTELLE MEM'L INST. LAw & JUSTICE STUDY CTR., FORCIBLE
RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS (1977), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED141655.pdf (finding that the quantity and
quality or rape prosecutions was dependent upon the resources devoted to
sexual assault cases).
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resources solely to the prosecution of certain serious violent
acts of sexual assault."
Another aspect of prosecution is plea-bargaining, the
prevailing method of criminal case disposition resulting in
guilty pleas in American criminal adjudication.H4 One of
the most influential factors in negotiating a plea is the
strength of the case."' Even though the charging process
for sexual assault crimes is similar to that of other serious
crimes and involves virtually the same pattern of screening,
there are additional factors that distinguish sexual assault
cases.'16 The familiarity of the victim to the perpetrator is
most often a distinguishing factor that usually shifts the
focus of the investigation to the moral reputation of the
victim, because more often than not in sexual assault cases,
the perpetrator is a non-stranger, and there is little or no
physical evidence of harm."'
III. PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY
Prosecutors are entrusted with the responsibility to
make complex and sometimes controversial decisions about
113. See, e.g., Loh, supra note 112, at 581-82 (discussing example of
specialized Sexual Assault unit in prosecutor's office, and advantages and
disadvantages of such specialized units).
114. See Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Plea Bargaining Policy and State District
Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 26 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 139,
139 (1992).
115. Dean J. Champion, District Attorneys and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis
of the Prosecutorial Priorities Influencing Negotiated Guilty Pleas, 20
PROSECUTOR 25, 26 (1987).
116. David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1208-18 (1997).
117. Id. at 1214-18. Stranger cases are more likely to be followed up by police
or pursued by prosecutors. However, studies analyzing victim-perpetrator
relationships and charging decisions do not show that the decisions are affected
by the type or quality of relationship the victim has with the perpetrator.
Rather, they show decisions are affected by different factors, such as the
suspect's prior criminal record, whether or not there were witnesses, etc. Cassia
Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of
Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances,
and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q., 651, 656-62 (2001) (citing Rodney F.
Kingsnorth, Randall C. MacIntosh and Jennifer Wentworth, Sexual Assault:
The Role of Prior Relationship and Victim Characteristics in Case Processing, 16
JUST. Q. 275 (1999)).
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whether to charge a crime. This authority is broad with
very limited constitutional and statutory constraints under
the presumption of prosecutorial good faith."' A prosecutor
must be responsible in seeking justice for the victim, the
accused, and society. There is also a presumption that she
or he does not want to prosecute an innocent person, or let
the guilty go free."' While a prosecutor should be mindful
of the effect of engendering public cynicism., about the
prosecutorial process, he or she should not allow that to be
the overarching guide in pursuing prosecution.20
Statutory and constitutional rules are limited to the
extent that they proscribe the boundaries within which
prosecutors act and make charging decisions. They only
require that prosecutors not bring unsubstantiated charges
and not engage in retaliatory or discriminatory practices. 2 '
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that the courts
lack the knowledge and expertise to supervise this
unchecked discretionary power."2
Some cases present difficult decisions for the
prosecutor. Using a grand jury in controversial cases will
lessen the effect of more publicized and politically charged
cases, and in certain cases provides some insulation for the
prosecutor against public criticism in the charging phase.'23
However, the prosecutor still controls grand jury action and
ultimately is still responsible for charging decisions.'24
118. See Albonetti, supra note 98, at 292.
119. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also JoY &
MCMUNIGAL, supra note 94, at 15.
120. See Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby, & Marion A. Brewer, The
Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary
Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 54-56 (1981)
(discussing interplay of rules and standards for prosecutors with prosecutorial
discretion). See generally JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY (1980) (discussing different influences on the prosecutor's role and
self-image); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION: A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE (1976).
121. Mellon et al., supra note 120, at 54.
122. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
123. MARVIN FRANKEL & GARY NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 21-23 (1977).
124. Id.
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A. The Problem of Unlawful Command Influence
The military justice system presents an interesting
juxtaposition in the prosecutorial structure, ethics, and
oversight. The problem of unlawful command influence has
been a plague to the effective operation of the military
justice system for even longer than the ongoing sexual
assault crisis.'25 Unlawful command influence occurs when
"a superior substitutes (or attempts to substitute) his or her
judgment for that of a subordinate" in matters where the
subordinate should be allowed to exercise independent
judgment.'26 Perceived command influence can be as
discrediting as actual command influence. Even though a
commander may not intend to do it, his or her actions and
the degree to which they exercise control over their
command sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish
between regular command and control duties and unlawful
influence.
At the pre-trial stages (preferral), it is presumed that
the commander is lawfully exercising command control
when he or she gathers evidence against members of his or
her command who are suspected of violating the UCMJ,
because that commander would not be involved in the
125. Firestone & Harris, supra note 27, at 127.
126. Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure §6-3(B); cf United
States v. Wallace, 39 M.J. 284 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding that superior
commander's suggestion that subordinate commander reconsider disposing
offenses by non-judicial punishment was not unlawful influence in the charging
decision because the subordinate exercised his independent judgment).
127. But see United States v. Johnston, 39 M.J. 242, 244 (C.M.A. 1994)
("[Tihere must be more than 'command influence in the air' to justify action by
an appellate court.") (citing United States v. Allen, 33 M.J. 209, 212 (C.M.A.
1991)). One such (extreme) case was appealed before the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records and ultimately resulted in a congressional
hearing when a defense counsel who raised the issue of unlawful command
influence in his client's appeal against his supervisor's advice was not selected
for promotion to the next rank when his supervisor later sat on the promotion
board. The congressional hearing and subsequent executive action resulted in
that supervisor not advancing to the next rank. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED
SERVICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES CONCERNING NOMINATIONS FOR
GENERAL OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, S. REP.
No. 102-1 (2d Sess. 1991).
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preliminary inquiry.'28 Unlawful command influence,
however, occurs when a convening authority for a special or
general court-martial conducts the preliminary hearing and
also acts as the accuser and prefers charges based on those
findings.129
Article 32 investigators are appointed by the convening
authority and must be neutral and impartial.'
Consequently, if there are ex parte contacts between the
command and the investigating officer, the convening
authority, or anyone else involved in the prosecution, it
raises a presumption of prejudice towards the accused."'
This is a rebuttable presumption, which places a heavy
burden on the prosecution to prove that there was no
unlawful command influence. Similarly, a convening
authority will be disqualified from referring charges if there
is a reasonable probability that he or she is personally
interested in the outcome of the litigation.'33 After a case is
referred to trial, a superior convening authority can
intervene and cause the charges be withdrawn or referred
to a higher court-martial, so long as this exercise of
authority is not arbitrary or unfair to the accused.'34
Another area of concern among opponents of the
deference and broad authority of the convening authority is
128. United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 302 (2004) (holding no unlawful
command influence occurred when a third-level superior strongly advised his
subordinate regarding the seriousness of the charges against accused and
reiterated the need for an Article 32 investigation).
129. Id. at 301-02.
130. ARMY PAMPHLET 27-17, PROCEDURAL GUIDE FOR ARTICLE 32(B)
INVESTIGATING OFFICER (1990, available at
http://www.campbell.army.mil/campbell/SJA/Documents/DA-PAM_27_17-32_IO
Guide.pdf.
131. United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 413-15 (C.M.A. 2006) (finding that
SJA and trial counsel tried to force recusal of military judge, and setting aside
the conviction of accused because prosecution did not show beyond a reasonable
that there was no appearance of unlawful command influence).
132. James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, American Military Justice System in
the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 197 (2002).
133. United States v. Voorhees, 50 M.J. 494, 498-99 (1999); United States v.
Crossley, 10 M.J. 376, 378 (C.M.A. 1981); see also UCMJ Art. 1(9), 10 U.S.C.A. §
801(9) (West, Westlaw through 112th Legis. Sess.).
134. See United States v. Brown, 22 M.J. 597, 599 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
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the selection of panel members. To accommodate some
disparities, some have suggested that the jury pool be
widened outside of the higher ranking enlisted members
and officers who always outrank an enlisted.'35 The opposite
effect could also be that only those "available" and perhaps
less qualified are chosen for the panels because the best
officers and most eligible candidates are held back for
"really important things, such as training for war."36 In
cases where the accused is higher ranking than the victim,
which is the case in many instances, there maybe situations
where the higher ranking service member is afforded more
credibility due to length of service and extensive experience
in his military occupation or specialty; other factors relating
to that service member's relative relationship with the
command and good character will also shed a much more
favorable light on the accused.'37 In those situations, the
lower ranking member is less likely to be believed."
Overall, a convening authority must remain impartial at all
times.
Cases like the United States v. Haagenson'" and United
States v. Villareal'40 offer (glaring) examples of unlawful
command influence in the pre-trial stages. In Haagenson,
the chief of staff for the base commander (subordinate to the
base commander) demanded that the charges against a
Chief Warrant Officer be withdrawn and upgraded from a
special court-martial to a general court-martial because he
wanted her out of the Marine Corps.14 ' The special court-
martial convening authority later claimed he withdrew the
charges at the advice of counsel and there was no unlawful
135. See Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the
Military: Time for a Change of Forum?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 335, 347 (1999).
136. Id.; see also James Kevin Lovejoy, Abolition of Court Member Sentencing
in the Military, 142 MIL. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1993).
137. See Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Note, The "Good Soldier" Defense:
Character Evidence and Military Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879,
882-85 (1999) (discussing how Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) "has been
interpreted to permit evidence of 'good military character'").
138. Id.
139. 52 M.J. 34 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
140. 52 M.J. 27 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
141. Haagenson, 52 M.J. at 36-37.
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influence.142 Again, the Court found that there was nothing
on the record to support the allegation that the SPCMCA
had been subject to unlawful command influence.143
Ultimately the military appellate court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), returned
the case to the court-martial convening authority for an
"appropriate disposition."'"
Unlawful command influence comes in many forms, and
ranges from intimidating witnesses to testify or not testify,
humiliating the accused in the presence of the whole unit by
removing his rank, publicly drawing conclusions as to guilt
or innocence, to making statements as to their position on
the proceedings or investigation to parties involved in the
case.14 Sometimes, the convening authority will go against
the sound legal advice of the SJA. The convening authority
in Villareal claimed that he sought the advice of his friend
(an acting superior convening authority) who responded,
"what would it hurt to send the issue to trial?"'46 Based on
this conversation, he then withdrew from a pre-trial
agreement he entered into with the accused when the
victim's family was "dissatisfied" with the terms of the
pretrial agreement.'47 He later transferred the case to
another convening authority.'48 The Court found that there
was no unlawful command influence that would violate
RCM 104, because the subordinate convening authority
initiated the call to his superior, and because the case was
transferred to a new convening authority, any possibility of
prejudice was removed."
These are examples of the inappropriate and frequent
instances of intrusion by actors that diminish the
effectiveness of the courts-martial process in the military
142. Id. at 36.
143. Id. at 37.
144. Id.
145. Major Deana M.C. Willis, The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions:
Finding and Fixing Unlawful Command Influence, ARivY LAw, Aug. 1992, at 3,
6-12.
146. United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J. 27, 29 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 30.
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justice .system. The convening authority is detailed with
multiple .duties, and also exercises broad discretion in
selecting panel members.5 o Eventually this sort of one-stop
shop leads to inconsistencies and conflicts within the
charging jiocess. Given this situation, it is no surprise that
commanding officers, convening authorities, investigators,
and Staff Judge Advocates sometimes wander outside the
limits of the rules or in some instances fail to act at all
when confronted with these conflicting responsibilities and
multiple obligations. . For example, in United States v.
Gutierrez, the SJA who prepared the post-trial
recommendations (PTR) also actively participates in the
preparation of the case against the appellant in the pre-trial
stage.)"' The C.A.A.F. held that a staff legal officer giving
general advice would not be disqualified from preparing
PTRs, but if that same person begins to participate in the
prosecution, they would be disqualified.'52
In addition, seeking the advice of a SJA is only required
when referring charges to a courts-martial, at which time
the command make a decision as to how to dispose of the
offense after receiving a report.' Even then, when a
commander receives legal advice from the SJA to ascertain
whether an accused should be tried by courts-martial, the
ultimate decision rests with the commander.'54
A commander may choose to dispose of the offense the
way he wants to, against the advice of the SJA. In such a
situation, the SJA's only way of overriding that authority is
to ask the commander's superior to remove that
commander's authority to bring the charge and convince the
commander to have a trial. However, this type of system
often lends itself to conflicts, as that same commander may
later evaluate the SJA for promotion.
150. See UCMJ Art. 25(d), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2006).
151. 57 M.J. 148, 149-50 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
152. Id.; see also Army Regulation [hereinafter AR] 27-10, at 16-3 (2005),
available at http://www.apd.army.mil/ pdffiles/r27_10.pdf.
153. See RCM, supra note 79, at Rule 601(a).
154. Id.; Art. 34(a); Richard B. Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military
Justice System: Is it Time for a Change? 19 Am. J. Crim. L. 395, 402 (1991).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given these circumstances, it is important to move
beyond legislation, and toward implementation. There must
be force behind reform measures so that the predicted
benefits of the reform match the realities of the crisis.
Several states over the years have taken into account the
prosecutorial function, policies and overall social influence
behind legislation since the rape reform movement emerged
in the 1970s."' The rape reform movement advocated new
legislation to reflect the legitimate status of women in
society."' A push began in state legislatures to revise
"antiquated" rape laws due to the surge in sex crimes in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.'" By the mid-1980s, most
states had some type of rape reform law."' Michigan was
one of the first states to take the lead and was haled as a
model for rape law reform."' However, changes to military
sex crimes laws have been slow and incremental. The
military has only recently caught up with some of the
changes, especially regarding gender-neutral graded
offenses and removal of the spousal exception.' With the
new Article 120 in place, some of the fundamental problems
in the military may be addressed, allowing these
improvements to be realized.
To effectively implement the proposed
recommendations, an analysis of similar studies of other
criminal prosecution systems will facilitate a better
understanding on how those systems would work in the
military justice system. This section analyzes the study
conducted by Beichner and Spohn, assessing prosecutorial
charging decisions in sexual assault cases in two
jurisdictions: Kansas City, Missouri and Dade County,
Miami.'"' These two jurisdictions had different procedures
155. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 69, at 20.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 22
160. See Major Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of
Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 26 (1995).
161. Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in
Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16
174 Vol. XIX
ADDING FORCE BEHIND MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM
for screening and prosecuting sexual assault and sexual
battery cases-Kansas City has a specialized unit and
employed a vertical system, wherein initial charging
decisions are made by the prosecutors in that unit, and one
prosecutor handles a case from start to finish.162 Miami had
no specialized system.163 Cases were initially screened by a
Felony Screening Unit and then prosecuted vertically
through the Felony Division." Kansas City appeared to
operate on the "trial sufficiency policy".165 They had high
levels of rejection at first screening and a correspondingly
high rate of conviction.166 Miami operated under the "system
efficiency model," where there are high levels of case
rejection, early disposal of cases, and high levels of guilty
pleas.16 7 The results showed that there were few differences
between the specialized and non-specialized units despite
variations in policy and patterns of case dispositions." One
explanation put forth by commentators is that the common
concern of prosecutors in the two different systems appears
to be with convictability.169 This seems to decrease the
relative benefits of specialized units, which put forth a more
"aggressive organizational posture" toward sexual assault
crimes than non-specialized units.170 However, there are
advantages to specialized units that could be beneficial if
they are incorporated into the military prosecutorial
system.
The findings of the Beichner and Spohn study offer a
workable alternative to the current hierarchal structure of
the commander-convening authority dynamic. First, the
CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 461 (2005). Dawn Beichner and Cassia Spohn are
professors at Illinois State University and University of Nebraska at Omaha,
respectively. Id. at 461. Both have written extensively on the criminal justice
system, sexual assault and gender research.
162. Id. at 470
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 476.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 479.
168. Id. at 490.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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use of the vertical system whereby one attorney handles a
case from beginning to end, whatever the disposition of the
case may be, allows the victim to maintain continuity with
the attorney instead of discussing the case with multiple
people several times each step in the process."' Second,
since the specialized model lends itself to access to the
technical experience in a specific area of sexual assault, the
prosecutor can be involved in the case at the early stages
sometimes as soon as the police investigation begins."I
Therefore, a reliable relationship is developed with the
victim, who is more willing to cooperate with someone who
is familiar and experienced in victim relations.'73 Third,
when prosecutors have gained experience in this specific
area over time, they will be better able to assess the merits
of cases, identify certain patterns or trends to make the
proper decisions that will improve the overall goals of the
new statutes, and comply with the policy initiatives of the
current reform measures as Congress intended.'74
These recommendations are non-intrusive to the overall
make up of the military justice structure. A removal of
sexual assault cases to civilian jurisdiction is not the better
solution either, despite the more streamlined procedures
available under that system. It would not be necessary to
impose such a drastic measure upon an already over
burdened civilian criminal jurisdiction. Investigation,
enforcement of new reform laws, and fact gathering under
the military justice system would be more conducive to the
transient nature of military. The military is more effective
to try cases where a tribunal can be convened as the need
arises. Furthermore, civilian jurisdiction of certain
individuals may be compromised due to the unique
structure of military training, national security and
readiness. As proposed before, other systems of prosecution
can be incorporated to adjust to the unique structure of
military justice.
First, a revision of the unfettered decision-making
process in violent crimes like sexual assault. Especially
serious incidents of aggravated sexual assault should
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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automatically trigger an initial investigation by a body
separate from the chain of command of the victim or
perpetrator and should remove the investigation and initial
screening process of cases to a neutral ground. Similar to
the trial defense system, an office of military lawyers who
are separate from the command body, a detached legal unit
will have no connection to the command. In addition,
personnel detailed to investigate these serious crimes will
not be promoted or supervised by anyone in the command
lest proper investigative actions be thwarted by the
supervisor or subordinate dynamic that have plagued
implementation of workable measures."'
Second, establish a special investigation body dedicated
to serious violent sexual assault that allows for continuity.
There are certain nuances that make sexual assault
prosecution different from other violations of the UCMJ,
such as assault,"' or the use or possession of drugs.177 There
are many more complex factors that need to be investigated
and considered in the legal regulation of sexual conduct
than in other areas of the law."
Ultimately, sexual assault should be treated as the
serious crime that it is: it threatens and eventually cripples
readiness of the work force, places service members at risk,
and even more so than other serious crimes,, demoralizes
and reduces trust in the military justice system. Because of
the increasing reports of sexual assault each year since
reporting began, and the prevalence of incidents, a
specialized unit in dealing with sexual assault is necessary.
It is a practice in the USAF for Article 32 officers to be
judge advocate in most cases.'79 Those personnel can be
trained in specific sexual assault response, in order to not
reduce or take away from the unit's capabilities. Therefore,
when commanders routinely change command there will
175. See Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for An Aging Beauty:
The Cox Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 2002 L. REv. M.S.U. -D.C.L. 57, 58 (2002).
176. UCMJ Art. 128, 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2006).
177. UCMJ Art. 112a, 10 U.S.C. § 912a (2006).
178. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex
Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REv. 305, 306 (1999).
179. See AIR FORCE MANUAL 51-204 § 2.2 (2010), available at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/ AFMAN51-204.pdf.
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always be a specific permanent unit to handle this complex
type of situation.
CONCLUSION
There should be a reexamination of training and
guidelines for commanders at the pre-trial stages to
enhance uniformity in charging decisions from the SJA on a
regular basis. Commanders must keep apprised of rules,
current policies and specialized training in dealing with
matters of sexual assault. This will help them in an initial
inquiry when a report is first made, when considering the
rights of the accused, and in their knowledge of victim
advocate resources. Commanders also must be aware of the
proper procedures in handling incidents that arise in
deployments, trainings and on-installation investigation
and legal resources. This results in consistency and
uniformity in charging and screening decisions and a more
streamlined pre-trial charging process.
The same should also be instituted for the convening
authority in the selection of officers and in their decision to
either refer charges to a higher court-martial or try it at the
level where it is preferred. More resources should be
provided, such as the opportunity to work closely with
SARCs to get the job done well. Sometimes key witnesses
are deployed, in training, or have left the command. In
those situations, the convening authority may be able to use
resources to compel investigators and officers to bring
together evidence. Having a designated SJA detail holds
significant advantage in disposing of cases appropriately
and ensures that experience will develop over time in
handling sexual assault cases.
It is much easier to maintain the status quo, especially
regarding the structure of the military justice system, but
the changes that are already in place must be used to
bolster not only the reporting and policy process, but the
investigation and prosecution as well. An understanding of
the policies, organization, and agents of the reform
measures implemented is necessary in determining the
effectiveness of those reforms.' The optimal results would
180. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM
IMPACT IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (1978) ("To create even a minimal possibility
of success, the nature of the reform. . . must be systematically examined.").
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be a reduction in the rate of sexual assault incidents across
all the military branches. More meaningful and tangible
results can demonstrate the predicted benefits of all these
reforms and enable the military to move beyond mere
symbolic change.

